Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of a sex crime and, upon his release from custody, was classified a level one sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration Act. Defendant was later charged with a violation of Nassau County Local Law 4, codified in Nassau County Administrative Code 8-130.6. That provision establishes residency restrictions on a “registered sex offender.” The code defines “registered sex offender” as a person who has been classified as a level one, level two, or level three sex offender and is required to register pursuant to the Act, regardless of whether the sex offender has actually registered. The district court dismissed the charge, determining that Local Law 4 is preempted by New York’s comprehensive statutory scheme for sex offenders. The Appellate Term reversed, concluding that the Legislature did not intend to occupy the entire field so as to prohibit the enactment of local laws imposing residency restrictions for sex offenders who are no longer on probation, parole supervision, or subject to a conditional discharge. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the unmistakable intent of the State to preempt the field prohibits the enactment of local residency restriction laws. View "People v. Diack" on Justia Law

After a trial, Defendant was convicted of attempted assault in the third degree and second degree harassment. The convictions arose from Defendant’s act of “banging into” the complainant with his shoulder. Defendant appealed his convictions, arguing that because the attempted assault and harassment counts were based on the same conduct, harassment must be treated as a lesser included offense of attempted assault. The Appellate Term affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that harassment is not a lesser included offense of attempted assault because the two counts do not share the same elements. View "People v. Repanti" on Justia Law

Petitioner was adjudicated a dangerous sex offender in need of confinement to a secure treatment facility. Petitioner later exercised his annual right to petition for discharge under N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law 10 and commenced a proceeding in Oneida County seeking his discharge from confinement. Petitioner then moved to change venue for the annual review hearing to New York County, citing to N.Y. Ment. Hyg. Law 10.08(e). Supreme Court denied the motion, finding that, while N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law 10.08(e) does allow venue to be changed for annual review hearings, Petitioner failed to establish the requisite good cause in this case. Thereafter, Supreme Court found that Petitioner remained a dangerous sex offender in need of confinement to a secure treatment facility. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) N.Y. Ment. Hyg. Law 10 authorizes a change of venue in article 10 annual hearings upon an appropriate showing of good cause; but (2) Petitioner failed to establish good cause for the change of venue. View "Tyrone D. v. State" on Justia Law

In 2009, Respondent regularly stayed in an apartment with his aunt, Petitioner. That same year, Petitioner filed a petition charging Respondent with various family offenses under Family Court Act article 8 and seeking an order of protection against him pursuant to Family Court Act section 842. Family Court found that Respondent was guilty of a family offense and entered a written two-year order of protection against him. While Respondent’s appeal was pending, the order of protection expired. The Appellate Division dismissed the appeal as moot. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the expiration of the order of protection did not moot the appeal because the order still imposed significant enduring legal and reputational consequences upon Respondent. Remitted to the Appellate Division for consideration of the appeal. View "Veronica P. v. Radcliff A." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a property owner, and Defendant, a tenant, entered into a one-year commercial rental lease agreement. Prior to the end of the one-year term, the parties extended the lease for a nine-year term. Several months after executing the lease extestion, Defendant vacated the premises and ceased paying rent. Plaintiff commenced this action for rent arrears and an amount equal to the future remaining rent owed on the lease. Supreme Court entered judgment for Plaintiff in the amount of $1,488,604, consisting of the rent remaining due under the lease, reduced by the amount of rent Plaintiff was able to collect by reletting the premises. Defendants appealed, arguing that Plaintiff was barred from collecting unpaid future rents pursuant to an acceleration clause in the leasehold agreement. The Court of Appeals affirmed as modified, holding that the court below erred by limiting the damages hearing to whether Plaintiff relet the premises without allowing Defendants the opportunity to present evidence that the undiscounted accelerated rent amount was disproportionate to Plaintiff’s actual losses, notwithstanding that Plaintiff had possession and no obligation to mitigate. View "172 Van Duzer Realty Corp. v Globe Alumni Student Assistance Ass’n, Inc." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the validity of a rule promulgated by the New York State Racing and Wagering Board (Respondent) mandating out-of-competition race horse drug testing. Petitioners commenced this hybrid article 78/declaratory judgment proceeding, alleging that the rule, referred to as the Out of Competition Testing Rule (OCTR) was not authorized by Respondent’s enabling legislation. Supreme Court granted the petition, finding that Respondent had acted in excess of its legislatively delegated power. The Appellate Division modified by effectively denying the petition, concluding that the OCTR was, for the most part, valid and that the rule’s promulgation lay within Respondent’s legislatively conferred authority to regulate and supervise race meets at which pari-mutuel wagering is permitted. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Respondent possesses the power to promulgate rules mandating warrantless, out-of-competition equine testing for proscribed doping agents. View "Ford v. N.Y. State Racing & Wagering Bd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a police officer with the New York City Police Department when she was injured while loading wooden police barriers onto a police flatbed truck. Plaintiff sued the City of New York and the New York City Police Department seeking damages, asserting, among other claims, a cause of action under N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law (GML) 205-e for failure to comply with N.Y. Labor Law 27-a, otherwise known as the Public Employee Safety and Health Act (PESHA). Plaintiff based her claims, in part, on the alleged unsafe and dangerous condition of the truck. Defendants moved for summary judgment, claiming that the general duty clause of Labor Law section 27-a(3)(a)(1) could not serve as a statutory predicate to Plaintiff’s GML 205-e cause of action. Supreme Court denied the motion in part, concluding that Labor Law 27-a(3)(a)(1) may serve as a predicate for a violation of GML 205-e. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that PESHA’s general duty clause serves as a predicate to Plaintiff’s GML 205-e cause of action for damages. View "Gammons v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Respondent pleaded guilty to sex offenses, including sexual abuse in the first decree. When Respondent’s term of imprisonment neared its end, the State commenced a civil commitment proceeding against him pursuant to N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law 10. After a bench trial, Supreme Court imposed strict and intensive supervision (SIST) rather than confinement. Respondent was required to attend a sex offender treatment program, but due to his failure to cooperate, Respondent was discharged and later arrested. Supreme Court subsequently revoked Respondent’s release on SIST and committed him to a secure treatment facility, determining that the State had proven that Respondent was a dangerous sex offender requiring confinement. The Appellate Division affirmed on the merits. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the Mental Hygiene Law envisages a distinction between sex offenders who have difficulty controlling their sexual conduct and those who are unable to control it; and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that Respondent had such an inability to control his behavior that he was likely to be a danger to others and to commit sex offenses if not confined to a secure treatment facility. View "State v. Michael M." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, which owns a residential co-op complex with 1,674 residential apartments, was incorporated in 1961 as a Mitchell-Lama cooperative housing corporation pursuant to the Limited-Profit Housing Companies Law. In 2007, Plaintiff terminated its participation in the Mitchell-Lama program and reconstituted itself as a corporation under the Business Corporation Law by amending its certification of incorporation. In 2010, the New York City Department of Finance issued a notice of determination to Plaintiff of a tax deficiency in the amount of $21,149,592, concluding that Plaintiff had engaged in a transaction that qualified as a conveyance of the underlying real property, and therefore, Plaintiff was required to pay a real property transfer tax (RPTT). Plaintiff commenced this action seeking a declaratory judgment that the RPTT was inapplicable. The Appellate Court ruled in favor of Plaintiff, concluding that the conversion from a Mitchell-Lama cooperative housing corporation to a cooperative housing corporation under the Business Corporation Law does not constitute a conveyance that is subject to the RPTT. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that no taxable event occurred in this case. View "Trump Vill. Section 3, Inc. v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested for burglary and, in an attempt to obtain leniency, told the police that a friend of his admitted that he stabbed a man at the supermarket. Defendant was represented by his lawyer at the meeting. After Defendant was released from jail, he discussed the supermarket stabbing with the police outside of the presence of his lawyer. Defendant was later charged with and convicted of attempted murder and assault. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that the police officers were not barred from questioning Defendant about the stabbing despite the fact that he was represented by counsel on the pending burglary charge, as the two charges were unrelated. The Court of Appeals reversed, suppressed Defendant’s statements, and ordered a new trial, holding (1) Defendant’s right to counsel encompassed his conversations with the police about the stabbing, as long as those conversations were part of an effort to obtain leniency in the burglary case in which his lawyer represented him; and (2) Defendant did not waive his right to be represented by counsel at the second meeting with law enforcement officers. View "People v. Johnson" on Justia Law