Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Nick Rigano purchased certain property and George Vignogna, through Vibar Construction Corp., agreed to develop the property. Vibar constructed a common driveway to access the property, but Rigano failed to compensate it. Vibar filed a notice of mechanic’s lien on the property to recover the cost of constructing the road. The notice listed Fawn Builders, Inc. as the owner of the property rather than Rigano, the true owner and Fawn Builders’ sole shareholder and president. Rigano sought to have the lien discharged on the ground that the notice did not comply with the Lien Law requirements. Supreme Court ultimately granted the petition and discharged the mechanic’s lien. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the notice was jurisdictionally defective because it misidentified the true owner of the property. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, under the particular circumstances presented here, the defect was a misdescription and not a misidentification, did not constitute a jurisdictional defect, and was curable by amendment. View "Rigano v. Vibar Constr., Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial in 1981, Defendant was convicted of rape in the first degree, murder in the second degree, and attempted robbery in the first degree. During trial, Defendant pursued a mistaken identity defense. Defendant later moved to vacate his conviction and for a new trial pursuant to N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 440.10(1) on the ground that newly discovered evidence in the form of mitochondrial DNA testing excluded him as the perpetrator of the crimes. Defendant sought an evidentiary hearing as part of his postjudgment motion. Supreme Court summarily denied Defendant’s motion. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that Defendant was not prejudiced by the absence of a hearing. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) because the rule announced in People v. Crimmins that the power to review a discretionary order denying a motion to vacate judgment on the ground of newly discovered evidence cease at the Appellate Division needlessly restricts the Court of Appeals’ power of review concerning section 440.10(1)(g) motions, that part of the decision is overruled; and (2) in this case, the Appellate Division abused its discretion in summarily denying Defendant’s motion for an evidentiary hearing. Remanded. View "People v. Jones" on Justia Law

A police officer stopped the car Defendant was driving due to traffic violations. After observing that Defendant appeared to be intoxicated, the officer asked Defendant to step out of the car and then patted him down. The officer found a switchblade knife in Defendant’s pocket and arrested him. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the knife. The motion was denied on the ground that the pat-down was justified as a search incident to arrest. Defendant subsequently pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a weapon. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the police officer’s search of Defendant was not incident to Defendant’s arrest because, although there was probable cause to arrest Defendant before the search, Defendant would not have been arrested if the search had not produced evidence of a crime. View "People v. Reid" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder and attempted second-degree murder, among other charges. Defendant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the count of the indictment charging him with attempted murder was rendered duplicitous due to events that unfolded during the course of the trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions, concluding that the duplicity argument was unpreserved. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a duplicity argument based on trial evidence must be preserved for appeal where the count is not duplicitous on the face of the indictment; and (2) none of the other issues raised by Defendant warranted reversal. View "People v. Allen" on Justia Law

Mahesh Gandhi and his two associates held equal interests in three corporations. The corporations secured a loan, part of which was loaned to the partners, of which Gandhi received a portion pursuant to promissory notes he signed and for which he made interest payments. Litigation among the partners and the corporations soon followed. The parties eventually executed a Settlement Agreement under which Gandhi sold his interest in the corporations to his associates. The corporate successors-in-interest to the corporations made monthly payments to Gandhi until Gandhi ceased paying interest on the notes. The corporations sued, asserting that they were entitled to offset the amount they owed Gandhi against the amount he owed them under the notes. At trial, Gandhi sought to assert a counterclaim for money current owed him under the Settlement Agreement. Supreme Court granted Gandhi’s motion to amend and entered judgment in his favor on the counterclaim. The Appellate Division reversed the judgment on Gandhi’s counterclaim, concluding that Gandhi’s request should have been barred by the doctrine of laches based on Gandhi’s delay in seeking leave to amend. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that there was no prejudice to the corporations in allowing Gandhi’s amendment to assert the counterclaim for outstanding payments. View "Kimso Apts., LLC v. Gandhi" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether Lewiston Golf Course Corporation, an indirect, wholly owned subsidiary of the Seneca Nation of Indians, a federal recognized Indian tribe, was protected from suit by the Seneca Nation’s sovereign immunity. Supreme Court ruled that Lewiston Golf did not qualify as an “arm” of the Seneca Nation and denied Lewiston Golf’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s foreclosure action with respect to its mechanic’s liens. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the most significant factors set forth in Matter of Ranson v. St. Regis Mohawk Educ. & Cmty. Fund counted against sovereign immunity on the part of Lewiston Golf. View "Sue/Perior Concrete & Paving, Inc. v. Corporation" on Justia Law

Allstate Insurance Company issued a policy of liability insurance to the landlord of a two-family house. The policy, which was renewed annually for the next two years, stated a $500,000 limit for “each occurrence” and contained a “noncumulation clause.” Felicia Young and her children and, subsequently, Lorenzo Patterson and his children lived in one of the apartments during the years covered by the policy. In 2004, Young, on behalf of her children, and Jannie Nesmith, on behalf of the Patterson children, her grandchildren, brought two separate actions against the landlord for personal injuries allegedly caused by lead paint exposure. Young’s action was settled for $350,000, which Allstate paid. Nesmith’s action was settled for $150,000, which Allstate claimed was the remaining coverage. Nesmith then brought the present action against Allstate seeking a declaration that a separate $500,000 limit applied to each family’s claim, entitling her grandchildren to an additional $350,000. Supreme Court granted Nesmith the declaration she sought. The Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that because Young’s children and Nesmith’s grandchildren were injured by exposure to the same general conditions, their injuries were part of a single loss, and only one policy limit was available to the two families. View "Nesmith v Allstate Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The owner and managing agent of an apartment building (collectively, the insureds) were insureds under two different policies: they were named insureds under their own policy and additional insureds under a policy obtained by a contractor they hired. When an employee of the contractor was injured, the contractor’s insurer, seeking to disclaim liability, sent written notice to the insureds’ own carrier but not to the insureds themselves. The insureds brought third party claims against the contractor and the contractor’s insurer, asserting that the contractor’s insurer was required to provide them with a defense and indemnification. Supreme Court granted summary judgment against the contractor’s insurer. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that the contractor’s insurer had failed to comply with N.Y. Ins. Law 3420(d)(2) because it had not sent its disclaimer notice to its additional insureds. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the contractor’s insurer failed to comply with section 3430(d)(2) under the circumstances of this case. View "Sierra v. 4401 Sunset Park, LLC" on Justia Law

The defendants in these two separate criminal cases were convicted of criminal offenses by a jury. The two juries each sent notes to the court requesting specific information for use in deliberations. The transcripts did not show in either case that the courts were aware of the juries’ submission of some of the notes. Defendants appealed, contending that the trial courts committed mode of proceedings errors under People v. O’Rama and its progeny by accepting the verdicts without acknowledging or responding to the jury notes at issue. The Court of Appeals reversed in both cases, holding that because the substantive jury notes, marked as court exhibits, were neither revealed to the attorneys nor addressed by the courts, a mode of proceedings error occurred under O’Rama in both cases, and the defendants were entitled to new trials. View "People v. Silva" on Justia Law

Strauss Painting, Inc./Creative Finishes, Ltd. contracted with the Metropolitan Opera Association, Inc. to perform work on the Met’s premises. At the time Strauss/Creative contracted with the Met, Strauss had in place a CGL policy issued by Mt. Hawley Insurance Company. Manuel Mayo, a Creative employee, was injured while working at the Met. Mayo sued the Met for negligence. The Met brought a third-party action against Strauss in the Mayo suit. Strauss then commenced this action against Mt. Hawley and the Met, seeking a declaration that Mt. Hawley was obligated to defend and indemnify it in the Met’s third-party action. The Met cross-claimed against Mt. Hawley seeking a declaration that it was an additional insured on Strauss’s CGL policy, thereby requiring Mt. Hawley to defend and indemnify it in the Mayo litigation. The lower courts concluded (1) Mt. Hawley was required to defend the Met in the Mayo lawsuit because the Met was an additional insured on Strauss’s CGL policy; and (2) Strauss’s notice of the accident to Mt. Hawley was untimely, and Mt. Hawley timely disclaimed coverage on that ground. The Court of Appeals modified the order of the Appellate Division by denying the Met’s motion for summary judgment on its first cross-claim, holding (1) the Met was not an additional insured on Strauss’s CGL policy with Mt. Hawley; and (2) Strauss’s notice to Mt. Hawley was untimely as a matter of law. View "Strauss Painting, Inc. v. Mt. Hawley Ins. Co." on Justia Law