Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After Plaintiff, Jandy Coleson, applied for an order of protection from her husband, Samuel Coleson (Coleson), New York City police officers escorted Plaintiff to a safe house and assured Plaintiff that Coleson had been arrested and was going to be sentenced to prison “for a while.” Two days later, Coleson stabbed Plaintiff in the back. Plaintiff’s son witnessed Coleson chasing Plaintiff with the knife. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and her son, commenced this negligence action against the City of New York and the NYPD (together, the City). Plaintiffs also alleged negligent infliction of emotional distress, arguing that the child was in the zone of danger during the incident. The Appellate Division affirmed Supreme Court’s grant of summary judgment for the City, concluding (1) Plaintiffs failed to establish that the City assumed an affirmative duty to protect Plaintiff from attacks by her husband; and (2) based on the lack of a special relationship, the claim’s claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress should also be dismissed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the acts of the police officers in this case were sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to justifiable reliance. View "Coleson v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for second-degree murder as a hate crime and second-degree murder. A jury convicted Defendant of the lesser included offense of first-degree manslaughter as a hate crime and acquitted him of the lesser included offense of first-degree manslaughter. Defendant moved to set aside the verdict, arguing that the verdict was repugnant because the crimes of first-degree manslaughter as a hate crime and ordinary first-degree manslaughter share the same basic elements. The sentencing judge denied Defendant’s motion to set aside the verdict on repugnancy grounds without elaborating on his reasoning. The Appellate Division modified the judgment by reversing Defendant’s conviction for first-degree manslaughter as a hate crime, concluding that the verdict was repugnant because the jury necessarily found that one of the essential elements of ordinary manslaughter in the first degree was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeals held that the jury’s verdict was inconsistent, and thus repugnant, and modified the order of the Appellate Division by granting the People leave to submit the charge of manslaughter in the first degree as a hate crime to another grand jury. View "People v. DeLee" on Justia Law

In these three putative class actions, Plaintiffs, current or former tenants of separate apartment buildings, sought damages for rent overcharges. All plaintiffs initially sought treble damages but then waived that demand. At issue was whether Plaintiffs’ claims could properly be brought as class actions. Defendants argued, among other things, that these actions were to “recover a penalty” because, even without trebling, the remedy provided by the Rent Stabilization Law (RSL) 26-516 is a penalty. In each case, the Appellate Division certified a question to the Court of Appeals. The Court answered (1) N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b), which prohibits any claim for penalties to be brought as a class action, permits otherwise qualified plaintiffs to utilize the class action mechanism to recover compensatory overcharges even though the RSL 26-516 does not specifically authorize class action recovery and imposes treble damages upon a finding of willful violation; and (2) maintaining these actions as class actions does not contravene the letter or the spirit of the C.P.L.R. or the RSL. View "Borden v. 400 E. 55th St. Assoc., L.P." on Justia Law

After School District notified Petitioner, a tenured school social worker, that she was to be suspended without pay for misconduct, Petitioner made a written request for a hearing on the specifications pursuant to N.Y. Educ. Law 3020-a. In response, Respondent told Petitioner that she could only challenge the disciplinary determination against her by means of the procedures set forth in a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the School District and a teachers association. Petitioner grieved the matter under the process specified in the CBA, without success. Petitioner then commenced this N.Y. CPLR 78 proceeding to annul the disciplinary determination, asserting that she had been disciplined without being afforded the process to which she was entitled under the Education Law. The Appellate Court granted the petition. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that because section 3020-a plainly provides that, in any CBA taking effect on or after September 1, 1994, tenured employees must be permitted to elect the discipline procedures set forth in section 3020-a, and because the governing renegotiated CBA became effective in 2006, Petitioner was not foreclosed from invoking the statutory procedure. View "Matter of Kilduff v. Rochester City Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an on-duty New York City police officer, was injured in an automobile collision that occurred when Plaintiff’s vehicle collided with another patrol vehicle driven by Steve Tompos, another police officer responding to the same radio call. Plaintiff commenced this action against Tompos and the City of New York, asserting a N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law 205-e claim predicated upon violations of N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law 1104. Supreme Court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The Appellate Division affirmed, determining that Tompos did not act in “reckless disregard” for the safety of others while operating his vehicle, and therefore, Defendants were entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Defendants met their burden of establishing that Tompos’s conduct did not amount to reckless disregard of a highly probable risk of harm with conscious indifference to the outcome. View "Frezzell v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a medical malpractice action in New York against Laser Spine Institute (LSI) and various LSI professionals after undergoing unsuccessful back surgeries at an LSI facility in Tampa, Florida. Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Supreme Court granted the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over LSI and its doctors because they were not transacting business in New York within the meaning of N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a)(1) and there was no personal jurisdiction under N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a)(3) because Plaintiff’s injury did not occur in New York. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that New York lacked personal jurisdiction over Defendants. View "Paterno v. Laser Spine Inst." on Justia Law

George Andrucki and his wife served on the Port Authority’s World Trade Center a notice of claim for personal injury from asbestos. Andrucki later died of his injuries, and his widow became his administratrix. Mrs. Andrucki did not serve a new notice of claim but amended the existing complaint to substitute herself as plaintiff. The amended complaint continued Andrucki’s personal injury action, which became a survivorship claim, and added a claim for wrongful death. Mrs. Andrucki then filed a supplemental summons to add the Port Authority as a defendant in the lawsuit. The Port Authority moved to dismiss the claims against it, asserting that Mrs. Andrucki failed to satisfy the conditions precedent to the bringing of the action. Supreme Court denied the motion to dismiss and entered a default judgment against the Port Authority. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that Mrs. Andrucki should have served on the Port Authority a new notice of claim concerning the wrongful death and survivorship actions. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Andrucki’s death did not require service of a new notice of claim. View "Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig." on Justia Law

In 2010, the Workers’ Compensation Board (“Board”) adopted Medical Treatment Guidelines, which include a list of pre-authorized medical procedures and set forth limitations on the scope and duration of each procedure. The Guidelines also set forth a variance procedure, under which the medical treatment provider requesting a variance must demonstrate that the requested treatment is medically necessary. In 2009, Claimant received authorization from the Special Fund for Reopened Cases (“the carrier”) for acupuncture for chronic neck and back pain that she suffered as a result of work-related injuries. In 2010, a doctor recommended that Claimant receive additional acupuncture treatment and requested two variances under the newly-created Guidelines. The carrier denied the variance requests. A Workers’ Compensation Law Judge determined that Claimant’s medical provider failed to show that the additional acupuncture treatments were medically necessary, and the Board affirmed. The Appellate Court affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the Board did not exceed its statutory authority in promulgating the regulations; (2) the variance procedure does not improperly shift the burden to the claimant’s treating physician to prove medical necessity; and (3) the Guidelines do not deny injured workers due process. View "Matter of Kigin v. State Workers' Comp. Bd." on Justia Law

Debtor lived in a rent-stabilized apartment for over forty years. Debtor filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and listed the value of her unexpired rent-stabilized lease as personal property exempt from the bankruptcy estate under N.Y. Debt. & Cred. Law 282(2) as a “local public assistance benefit.” The bankruptcy court struck the claimed exemption, concluding that the value of the lease did not qualify as an exempt local public assistance benefit. The district court affirmed. Debtor appealed, arguing that the value of her lease was a local public assistance benefit that was exempted from her bankruptcy estate. The Second Circuit certified a question to the New York Court of Appeals regarding the issue. The Court of Appeals answered that section 282(2) exempts a debtor-tenant’s interest in a rent-stabilized lease. View "Matter of Santiago-Monteverde" on Justia Law

Petitioner Merry-Go-Round Playhouse, a not-for profit theater corporation, owned real property that it used to house its staff and summer stock actors. Petitioner filed applications for real property tax exemptions under N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law 420-a. The Assessor of the City of Auburn denied the applications. Supreme Court upheld the denial, determining that Petitioner failed to establish that its summer theater was an exempt purpose and that the use of apartment buildings to house its employees was reasonably incidental to its primary purpose. The Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Petitioner established its entitlement to the tax exemption because the use of the property to provide staff housing was reasonably incidental to Petitioner’s primary purpose of encouraging appreciation of the arts through theater. View "Matter of Merry-Go-Round Playhouse, Inc. v. Assessor of City of Auburn" on Justia Law