Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Sixteen-year-old Jessica Bowers sustained severe injuries when she was dragged into the rotating driveline of a tractor-driven post hole digger that was operated by her stepfather, who had borrowed the digger from Peter Smith. Smith had previously removed a plastic safety shield from the machine after years of use had left the shield damaged beyond repair. Plaintiff sued the digger’s seller, distributor, manufacturer, component maker, and others, asserting claims sounding in negligence and strict products liability. Defendants argued that they were entitled to summary judgment based on the substantial modification defense articulated in Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Division of Package Machinery Company because Smith made post-sale modifications to the digger that rendered the digger defective and proximately caused Plaintiff’s injuries. Supreme Court denied summary judgment with regard to the design defect claims. The case proceeded to trial, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Plaintiff raised triable issues of fact regarding the defective design of the safety shield that were sufficient to defeat summary judgment based on substantial modification.View "Hoover v. New Holland N. Am., Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred by not submitting to the jury the question of whether the People’s key witness was an accomplice and, if so, whether his testimony was sufficiently corroborated. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, concluding that the witness could not reasonably be considered to have participated in the crime and that there was overwhelming evidence corroborating his testimony. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the evidence created a factual issue as to whether the witness was an accomplice, and the trial court’s failure to charge the jury with an “accomplice-in-face” instruction was not harmless.View "People v. Sage" on Justia Law

Roberta Oldenborg was driving Matthew Isabella back from a business meeting in a vehicle owned by Michael Koubek when Oldenborg collided with a vehicle driven by Doris Hallock and owned by Peter Hallock. Isabella was injured in the accident but was precluded under the New York Workers’ Compensation Law from bringing an action against Oldenborg since she was his coworker. Instead, Isabella received workers’ compensation benefits secured by his employer. Isabella and his wife subsequently filed a personal injury action against the Hallocks. The Hallocks, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against Koubek seeking contribution and indemnification, asserting that the accident resulted from Oldenborg’s negligence and that Koubek was vicariously responsible. A jury found the Hallocks ten percent liable and Koubek ninety percent liable. The Court of Appeals answered a certified question of law and answered that a defendant may not pursue a third-party contribution claim against the owner of a vehicle where the vehicle driver’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s injuries but the driver is protected from suit by the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Law.View "Isabella v. Koubek" on Justia Law

In 1979, Plaintiff began his employment with Defendant, New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation (HHC), where he was eventually promoted to health facilities planner. In 2005, Plaintiff was diagnosed with pneumoconiosis, an occupational lung disease. In 2007, Defendant terminated Plaintiff. In 2008, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging, among other claims, that HHC had unlawfully discriminated on the basis of disability in violation of the State Human Rights Law (State HRL) and the City Human Rights Law (City HRL). Supreme Court granted summary judgment for HHC, concluding that Plaintiff could not, even with a reasonable accommodation, perform the essential functions of his job. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed as modified, holding that HHC was not entitled to summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff’s State HRL and City HRL claims, as (1) both statutes generally preclude summary judgment in favor of an employer where the employer has failed to demonstrate that it responded to a disabled employee’s request for a particular accommodation by engaging in a good faith interactive process regarding the feasibility of that accommodation; and (2) under the facts of this case, Plaintiff presented colorable claims of disability discrimination under the City HRL and State HRL.View "Jacobsen v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp." on Justia Law

In 2001, Defendant was found guilty of robbery and other crimes and sentenced to terms of imprisonment. Supreme Court later ordered that Defendant be resentenced, determining that Defendant’s sentence was illegal because it did not include a mandatory term of post-release supervision (PRS). After Defendant was conditionally released, Supreme Court resentenced Defendant by imposing a term of PRS. In 2009, the maximum term of Defendant’s prison sentence passed. In 2010, Defendant filed a motion to set aside his second sentence, arguing that the imposition of PRS constituted double jeopardy because he was out of prison on conditional release when it was imposed. Supreme Court granted the motion and resentenced Defendant, reimposing the terms of his completed initial sentence. The Appellate Division dismissed the People’s appeal, concluding that imposing PRS in this case would constitute double jeopardy. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) Defendant had not acquired a legitimate expectation of finality in his sentence because the direct appeal of the sentence Defendant served was not over; and (2) therefore, the prohibition against double jeopardy was not implicated in this case.View "People v. Cintron" on Justia Law

Plaintiff resided in an apartment from approximately 1997 until 2003. A corporation owned the building during Plaintiff’s occupancy until shortly before Plaintiff vacated the premises. In 2004, Plaintiff sued the corporation, the building’s current landlord, and other parties, alleging that she developed health problems due to mold and other harmful substances in the apartment. The corporation and landlord sought to dismiss the complaint to the extent that Plaintiff alleged mold-induced personal injuries, arguing that Plaintiff was unable to prove either general or specific causation. Supreme Court dismissed all of Plaintiff’s causes of action except those for property damage and breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment. The Appellate Division reversed and reinstated the complaint, concluding that the standard of scientific reliability set forth in Frye v. United States was satisfied in this case. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Plaintiff did not demonstrate on the record a cause-and-effect relationship between exposure to indoor mold and the kinds of injuries she alleged.View "Cornell v. 360 W. 51st St. Realty, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2004, Plaintiff, a manufacturer and distributor of medical devices, and Defendant, the developer and manufacturer of CoStar, a coronary stent, entered into an agreement designating Plaintiff as the exclusive distributor of CoStar for a worldwide market territory. In 2007, Defendant notified Plaintiff that it was recalling CoStar and removing it from the worldwide market. Plaintiff subsequently sued Defendant for breach of contract, seeking damages for lost profits related to its resale of the stents. Supreme Court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant on the issue of damages, concluding that the lost profits sought by Plaintiff were consequential damages and subject to the agreement’s damages limitation provision. The court subsequently dismissed the complaint because, by denying Plaintiff lost profits as a remedy, the court effectively ended the lawsuit. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that Plaintiff’s claim was barred by the agreement’s limitation on consequential damages. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, under the parties’ exclusive distribution agreement, the lost profits constituted general damages, which fell outside the scope of the agreement’s limitation on recovery.View "Biotronik A.G. v. Conor Medsystems Ireland, Ltd." on Justia Law

This action stemmed from property damage and the resulting business interruption sustained by Plaintiffs as a result of water damages that occurred following three separate roof breaches. Plaintiffs were Deborah Voss and three business entities owned and controlled by her. Plaintiffs sued CH Insurance Brokerage Services Co. (CHI), their insurance broker, arguing that a special relationship existed with CHI and that CHI had negligently secured inadequate levels of business interruption insurance for the three losses. Supreme Court granted summary judgment for CHI, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that CHI did not satisfy its initial burden of establishing the absence of a material issue of fact as to the existence of a special relationship.View "Voss v. Netherlands Ins. Co." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of murder in the second degree for suffocating her stepdaughter. The Appellate Division found the jury verdict was against the weight of the evidence and modified the County Court’s judgment by reducing the murder conviction to a conviction of second-degree manslaughter. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s confession to the police following the child’s death was sufficiently corroborated by independent evidence at trial to support Defendant’s conviction; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting certain letters into evidence, as they were sufficiently redacted; and (3) Defendant was not denied effective assistance of trial counsel.View "People v. Santiago" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with third-degree sexual abuse, forcible touching, and public lewdness for rubbing his exposed penis against another man’s buttocks without the victim’s consent. Defendant pleaded guilty to forcible touching in full satisfaction of the information. Defendant appealed, contending that the information was jurisdictionally defective because it stated that Defendant simply “rubbed” his groin and exposed his penis against the victim’s intimate parts, which conduct did not fulfill the “forcible” component of the crime. The Appellate Term affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that any bodily contact involving the application of some level of pressure to the victim’s sexual or intimate parts qualifies as a forcible touch within the meaning of N.Y. Penal Law 130.52. View "People v. Guaman" on Justia Law