Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was whether the “separate entity” rule continues to be valid law and serves to prevent a judgment creditor from ordering a garnishee bank operating branches in New York to restrain a judgment debtor’s assets held in foreign branches of the bank. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit certified this question of law to the New York Court of Appeals. Plaintiff, the judgment creditor in this case, asked the Court of Appeals to disavow the separate entity doctrine as outmoded and unnecessary. Defendant, the garnishee bank, urged that the rule remains vital in the context of international banking. The Court of Appeals answered the certified question in the affirmative, holding that the separate entity remains valid, and thus, a judgment creditor’s service of a restraining notice on a garnishee bank’s New York branch is ineffective under the separate entity rule to freeze assets held in the bank’s foreign branches. View "Motorola Credit Corp. v Standard Chartered Bank" on Justia Law

At issue in this lawsuit was whether workers engaged in testing and inspection of fire protection equipment are covered by New York’s prevailing wage statute. The New York State Department of Labor issued an opinion letter stating that the workers were covered but that the opinion shall be applied prospectively. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit certified to the Court of Appeals a question regarding what deference a court should pay to an agency’s decision, made for its own enforcement purposes, to construe a statute prospectively only. In its amicus brief in the Court of Appeals, the Department asserted that no deference was due to it by the courts deciding the litigation. The Court of Appeals answered (1) courts should give an agency no more deference than it claims for itself; and (2) a party’s commitment to pay prevailing wages pursuant to the prevailing wage statute binds the party to comply with the statute as correctly interpreted, whether or not the correct interpretation was known to the parties at the time of contracting. View "Ramos v. SimplexGrinnell LP" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Paul Ellington, an heir and grandson of Duke Ellington, filed this breach of contract action to recover royalties allegedly due under a royalty provision contained in a 1961 United States copyright renewal Agreement between Duke Ellington and Mills Music, Inc., now EMI Music, Inc. The Agreement assigned to a “Second Party” - defined as consisting of a group of music publishers including Mills Music - the right to renew the copyright to certain music compositions written by Duke Ellington, subject to the payment of royalties. The royalty provision of the Agreement required the Second Party to pay Duke Ellington and named members of his family a percentage of the net revenue received from a foreign publication of the musical publication. Plaintiff claimed that by using affiliated foreign subpublishers, EMI breached the Agreement by diluting Plaintiff’s share of the royalties. Supreme Court dismissed the complaint in its entirety, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the disputed terms of the Agreement were clear and unambiguous and that the Appellate Division correctly held that Plaintiff did not state a cause of action for breach of the Agreement. View "Ellington v. EMI Music, Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first and third degrees, criminal possession of marihuana, and two counts of criminally using drug paraphernalia. The Appellate Division modified the judgment and reversed the convictions on the counts of criminal possession of a controlled substance, concluding that the trial court erred in charging the jury on Defendant’s knowing criminal possession of drugs under the “drug factory” presumption of N.Y. Penal Law 220.25(2) because Defendant was not within “close proximity” to the controlled substances at the time the substances were found. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the trial court erred in charging that jury on the presumption under section 220.25(2) because Defendant was not within close proximity to the drugs found in his apartment once he exited the premises and entered his car, and no evidence suggested that he was in immediate flight from the premises in an attempt to escape an arrest; and (2) the error was not harmless, and a new trial should be granted on the counts of the indictment for criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first and third degrees. View "People v. Kims" on Justia Law

Plaintiff retained Attorneys to pursue a medical malpractice action against the Veteran’s Administration, the University of Rochester, and an opthalmologist. A federal district court disposed of the majority of Plaintiff’s claims on summary judgment. After Plaintiff was informed by Attorneys that he was unlikely to succeed on his remaining claim, Plaintiff discontinued the underlying action. Subsequently, Plaintiff retained new counsel to sue Attorneys for legal malpractice in failing to timely sue the University and the opthalmologist. Defendants argued that Plaintiff was estopped from commencing this action because he failed to appeal the underlying action. Supreme Court denied Attorneys’ motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) a failure to appeal bars a legal malpractice action only where the client was likely to have succeeded on appeal in the underlying action; and (2) in this case, Attorneys failed to provide sufficient evidence to determine that Plaintiff would have been successful on appeal. View "Grace v. Law" on Justia Law

Defendant retained attorney Martineau to represent him on several criminal charges. When Martineau’s health declined, Defendant’s file was delivered to attorney Bruno. A week before trial was due to begin, Bruno moved, unsuccessfully, to adjourn the trial date. Bruno renewed his motion one day before trial, again without success. Defendant was found guilty of all charges. Defendant moved to set aside the verdict, arguing that the county court’s denial of the motions for adjournment violated his right to the retained attorney of his choice. The county court denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that when Defendant moved, through counsel, for adjournment, the county court was not obliged to inquire of Defendant whether he was in fact seeking new counsel. View "People v. O'Daniel" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of three counts of attempted second degree murder, two counts of first degree assault, assault in the second degree, reckless endangerment in the first degree, and related counts. Defendant appealed, arguing that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to request a charge permitting, but not requiring, the jury to infer that the content of a tape from a video surveillance camera trained upon the location of the altercation would not have been favorable to the prosecution. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that there was not a reasonable probability that the jury, if offered the opportunity, would have chosen to draw an inference adverse to the prosecution as to what the missing video would have shown, and therefore, Defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice attributable to counsel’s inadequacy. View "People v. Blake" on Justia Law

Defendant was serving a sentence for his robbery conviction when he was interviewed in the absence of counsel regarding a murder. Before Defendant was interviewed about the murder, the lawyer who represented Defendant in the robbery indicated to law enforcement officers that he no longer represented Defendant. Defendant subsequently pleaded guilty to the murder. Defendant moved to set aside his conviction, arguing that the interview violated his right to counsel because he gave his statement outside the presence of his counsel. The county court denied the motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the officers’ questioning of Defendant did not violate the rule that, once an attorney has entered the proceeding, the defendant cannot be questioned in the absence of counsel unless he waives his right to counsel in the attorney’s presence, because the police reasonably concluded, after talking to the lawyer at issue, that he was no longer Defendant’s counsel. View "People v. McLean" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sustained debilitating injuries after exiting an apartment through a window and falling off an unguarded edge of a setback roof into an air shaft. Plaintiff commenced this personal injury action against Defendants, the owners and managers of the apartment building, arguing that Defendants created and maintained a dangerous condition and negligently caused his injuries by failing to install a railing around the perimeter of the air shaft. Supreme Court denied Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the complaint, concluding (1) the building was grandfathered out of the 1968 and 2008 New York City Building Codes and complied with earlier regulations; and (2) Defendants had no duty to mitigate the risk of an accident such as Plaintiffs’ fall because it was unforeseeable that individuals would choose to access the setback. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Defendants failed to make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law with respect to whether the absence of a protective guard on the setback roof violated the building codes and whether the accident was foreseeable. View "Powers v. 31 E 31 LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Robert Davis and Michael Lang, commenced this action against Defendants, Syracuse University and James Boeheim, the University’s head basketball coach, for defamation based on statements made by Boeheim in response to Plaintiffs’ allegations of sexual molestation by the associate basketball coach. Defendants moved to dismiss on the grounds that the statements were not defamatory as a matter of law because they constituted nonactionable opinion rather than facts. Supreme Court agreed with Defendants and granted the motion to dismiss. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the complaint must be deemed to sufficiently state a cause of action because there was a reasonable view of the claims upon which Plaintiffs would be entitled to recover for defamation. View "Davis v. Boeheim" on Justia Law