Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs brought legal malpractice claims against Jeffrey Daniels, American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Company’s insured. American Guarantee wrongly refused to defend the claims. A default judgment was entered against Daniels, who assigned his rights against American Guarantee to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs then brought the present action seeking to enforce American Guarantee’s duty to indemnify Daniels for the judgment. Summary judgment was awarded in favor of Plaintiffs. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that American Guarantee’s breach of its duty to defend barred it from relying on policy exclusions as a defense to the present lawsuit. The Court later granted reargument, vacated its prior decision, and reversed the Appellate Division’s order, holding (1) under controlling precedent, American Guarantee was not barred from relying on policy exclusions as a defense; and (2) the applicability of the exclusions American Guarantee relied on presented an issue of fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment.View "K2 Inv. Group, LLC v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Filippo Gallina and his wife (Plaintiffs) commenced a personal injury action against Preferred Trucking Services Corp. Preferred Trucking was insured by County-Wide Insurance Company under a policy that required insureds to cooperate with Country-Wide in its investigation of a claim or defense against a lawsuit. The next year, Country-Wide disclaimed its obligation to defend and indemnify Preferred Trucking based upon Preferred Trucking’s refusal to cooperate in the defense. Supreme Court subsequently awarded judgment to Plaintiffs. Thereafter, Country-Wide filed this action against Preferred Trucking and Plaintiffs seeking a declaration that it was not obligated to defend and indemnify Preferred Trucking in the underlying action. Supreme Court concluded that Country-Wide was obligated to defend and indemnify Preferred Trucking. At issue on appeal was whether Country-Wide’s disclaimer was timely as a matter of law. The Appellate Court affirmed, concluding that Country-Wide’s disclaimer was untimely because it came four months after Country-Wide learned of the ground for the disclaimer. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Country-Wide was not obligated to defend and indemnify Preferred Trucking, as Country-Wide established as a matter of law that its delay was reasonable. View "Country-Wide Ins. Co. v. Preferred Trucking Servs. Corp. " on Justia Law

Plaintiff-hospital engaged Defendant to undertake demolition in a basement room at the hospital. Defendant hired brothers Luis and Gerardo Lema, undocumented aliens not legally employable in the United States. The Lemas were injured while performing the work and sued the hospital for violations of the state’s Labor Law. Supreme Court granted the Lemas summary judgment on liability. The hospital, meanwhile, brought this action for common-law and contractual contribution and indemnification against Defendant to recover damages incurred in the Labor Law litigation with the Lemas. Supreme Court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint did not state a cause of action, reasoning that N.Y. Workers’ Comp. Law 11 barred the hospital’s action. In so holding, the court determined that non-compliance with the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) did not deprive Defendant of the protection of section 11. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Defendant was entitled to the safe harbor in section 11 because the Lemas did not suffer grave injuries, there was no preexisting agreement for contractual contribution or indemnification, and the hospital did not contend that IRCA preempts section 11.View "N.Y. Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens v Microtech Contracting Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff had a $1 million insurance policy from Defendant on an office building. On February 23, 2007, the building was severely damaged in a fire. Defendant paid Plaintiff the actual cash value of the destroyed building in the amount of $757,812 but withheld the cost of replacing the destroyed property until Plaintiff could replace the property. The replacement building was completed in October 2010. Plaintiff brought an action against Defendant seeking payment of the unpaid portion of the policy limits. The U.S. district court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the policy barred any suits commenced more than two years after the date of the damage and that the two-year limitation period was reasonable. The Court of Appeals answered a question from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and held that such a contractual limitation period, applied to this case in which the property could not reasonably be replaced in two years, was unreasonable and unenforceable.View "Executive Plaza, LLC v. Peerless Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Defendant was tried on two counts of burglary. At his jury trial, Defendant asked to proceed pro se. Ultimately, the trial court granted Defendant’s request to represent himself. Defendant was convicted of the two counts of burglary. On appeal, Defendant argued that his constitutional right to counsel was violated when the trial court failed sua sponte to inquire into his mental capacity to represent himself prior to granting his application to proceed pro se. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to undertake a particularized assessment of Defendant’s mental capacity when resolving his request to proceed pro se; (2) there was no basis to disturb the conviction on Faretta grounds; and (3) Defendant’s argument that the trial court should have ordered a N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 730.30 examination to assess whether Defendant possessed the baseline mental competency to stand trial was without merit.View "People v. Stone" on Justia Law

After a nonjury trial, Defendant was convicted of unlawful surveillance in the second degree for standing outside the front door of his neighbor’s townhouse and filming the complainant while she was naked in her second floor bathroom. Defendant appealed, arguing that insufficient evidence supported his conviction. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that the evidence established that Defendant had surreptitiously recorded the complainant for his own amusement at a time and place where she had a reasonable expectation of privacy. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that each element of the offense of unlawful surveillance in the second degree was established beyond a reasonable doubt.View "People v. Schreier" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of two counts of first-degree robbery as an accessory and one count of second-degree murder as an accessory. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment. Defendant appealed, contending that there was insufficient evidence of a robbery in the course of which the killing occurred. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that a rational jury could have inferred beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant, and the men he aided, stole $40,000 from the victim before attacking the victim, and therefore, the evidence was legally sufficient to support the judgment of conviction.View "People v. Reed" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 250.10, which requires a defendant to provide notice of intent to offer evidence in connection with the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance (EED). Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder. During trial, Defendant requested that the jury be instructed on EED. The trial court ruled that it would submit an EED charge to the jury on the condition that the People be given the opportunity to present testimony concerning Defendant’s mental state. Consequently, Defendant withdrew his request. Defendant later moved to set aside the verdict, arguing in part that the trial court erred by failing to give the EED charge when the People’s evidence supported that charge. Supreme Court denied the motion, concluding that Defendant’s request for an EED charge served as section 250.10 notice that Defendant intended to proffer psychiatric evidence that supported an EED defense, and thus, the People were entitled to offer testimony to rebut that defense. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that section 250.10 does not apply where a defendant offers no evidence at trial but requests an EED jury charge based solely upon evidence presented by the People.View "People v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

In 2000, Defendant pleaded guilty to first-degree manslaughter and was sentenced to twenty-three years incarceration. After Defendant’s incarceration, the Department of Correctional Services added a five-year PRS term to her certificate of commitment. In 2009, Defendant filed a pro se motion claiming that her plea was defective and her sentence illegal because she was not informed before she was incarcerated that she would be required to serve an additional term of PRS. Defendant was resentenced to the original sentence of twenty-three years without a term of PRS. Defendant appealed the resentence. Defendant’s counsel filed a motion under People v. Crawford asking to be relieved as counsel because there were no non-frivolous issues to be raised on Defendant’s behalf. Defendant subsequently filed a pro se supplemental brief arguing, inter alia, that the sentence was illegal. The appellate division granted counsel’s motion and affirmed the resentence without addressing Defendant’s pro se contentions. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the appellate division erred in granting the Crawford motion, and therefore, remittal for a de novo appeal was warranted.View "People v. Beaty" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was being treated at a private medical facility, a nurse employed by the clinic committed an unauthorized disclosure of Plaintiff’s confidential health information. Plaintiff filed this action in federal court against Defendants, various affiliated entities that allegedly owned or otherwise controlled the clinic. The district court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss all eight of Plaintiff’s claims. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of all but one of Plaintiff’s causes of action, reserving decision on Plaintiff’s claim of breach of fiduciary duty. In a separate opinion, the Second Circuit found the nurse’s actions were not foreseeable to Defendants nor taken within the scope of her employment. The court, however, certified a question to the New York Court of Appeals regarding Defendants’ liability where respondeat superior liability is absent. The Court of Appeals answered that, under New York law, the common law right of action for breach of the fiduciary duty of confidentiality for the unauthorized disclosure of medical information may not run directly against medical corporations when the employee responsible for the breach acts outside the scope of her employment. View "Doe v. Guthrie Clinic, Ltd." on Justia Law