Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

New York City police officers and firefighters appointed on or after July 1, 2009 are tier three members of the New York City Police Pension Fund and the New York City Fire Department Pension Fund. Petitioners filed a complaint alleging that the City of New York unlawfully deducted three percent from the gross annual wages of its tier three police officers and firefighters as mandatory employee pension contributions. At issue in this case was whether N.Y. Retire. & Sox. Sec. Law 480(b) obligates a public employer to pay any portion of a tier three public employee’s statutorily required pension contribution. The Appellate Division answered that question in the positive. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that section 480(b) only encompasses temporary programs in place as of 1974 for tier one and two members of a public employee retirement system. View "Lynch v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, current and/or former longtime smokers of Marlboro cigarettes, filed this putative class action in federal court against Philip Morris USA, Inc. asserting, among other claims, an equitable cause of action for medical monitoring. Plaintiffs sought the creation of a court-supervised program at Philip Morris's expanse that would provide them with a type of medical monitoring that would assist in the early detection of lung cancer. The district court dismissed the medical monitoring claim, holding that although the New York Court of Appeals would likely recognize the medical monitoring claim, Plaintiffs failed to plead that Philip Morris's allegedly tortious conduct was the reason Plaintiffs needed to secure a monitoring program. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals certified questions of law to the New York Court of Appeals as to whether an independent cause of action for medical monitoring exists in New York. The Court answered by holding that, under New York law, a current or former longtime heavy smoker who has not been diagnosed with a smoking-related disease, and who is not under investigation by a physician for such a suspected disease, may not pursue an independent equitable cause of action for medical monitoring for such a disease.View "Caronia v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. " on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of robbery. During trial, a video recording was admitted into evidence that showed the crime victim being robbed by two men. The victim identified Defendant as one of the robbers and testified to a description he had given the police the night of the crime. Although the victim's description generally fit Defendant, the victim alleged that Defendant was wearing a white shirt the night of the crime, while the man in the video alleged to be Defendant was wearing a blueish-gray shirt. Also during trial, two police officers testified that the victim had given a description on the night of the crime. The officers proceeded to give the accounts of the victim's description. Defendant appealed, arguing that the officers' testimony had improperly bolstered that of the victim. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Defendant's argument failed on the merits because a police officer's testimony to a victim's description, where it does not tend to mislead the jury, may be admissible under the rule set forth in People v. Huertas, which establishes that a crime victim can testify to his own description of his attacker given to the police shortly after the crime. View "People v. Smith" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sold fine art and antiques at public auctions. Plaintiff permitted absentee bidding in addition to traditional in-person bidding. In 2008, Defendant submitted a signed absentee bidder form and submitted a $400,000 bid on a certain item. Defendant successfully outbid a competing bidder, and the chief clerk recorded the winning bid on Plaintiff's clerking sheet. After Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff for the item, Plaintiff commenced this action for breach of contract, seeking damages, including the bid price and the buyer's premium. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. At issue in this case was whether the clerking sheet and related bidding documents satisfied the Statute of Frauds. Supreme Court granted summary judgment to Plaintiff on liability. The Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Plaintiff complied with the statutory requirement of a writing in support of its breach of contract claim, thus establishing an enforceable agreement.View "William J. Jenack Estate Appraisers & Auctioneers, Inc. v. Rabizadeh" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. The jury returned a verdict convicting Defendant of both counts. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that it may infer that Defendant possessed the weapon with the intent to use it unlawfully against another. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the evidence that Defendant possessed a loaded firearm, together with the statutory presumption of intent arising from the possession, was legally sufficient to support his conviction for criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. View "People v. Galindo" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a resident of Alberta, Canada, commenced an action against Defendants in a New York federal court asserting various RICO claims stemming from a dispute over control of an oil field in Siberia. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals eventually dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, concluding that a United States federal court could not provide relief. Within six months of the federal action’s termination, Plaintiff refiled in Supreme Court claims arising from the same transaction. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that it was untimely because Plaintiff’s injuries accrued in Alberta, and Plaintiff’s claim was untimely under Alberta law. Supreme Court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint as time-barred, concluding that New York’s borrowing statute required her to apply Alberta's shorter limitations period to determine if Plaintiff’s state court action was timely. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that New York’s savings statute permitted the “new” state court action because its “prior” federal court action was timely under the borrowing statute. View "Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Blavatnik" on Justia Law

In 2012, in an effort to combat obesity among residents of New York City, the New York City Board of Health amended the City Health Code so as to restrict the size of cups and containers used by food service establishments for the provision of sugary drinks. The proposed rule, referred to as the “Portion Cap Rule,” was to go into effect in 2013. Six not-for-profit and labor organizations challenged the Portion Cap Rule. Supreme Court, New York City declared the rule invalid and permanently enjoined its implementation. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, in adopting the Portion Cap Rule, the Board of Health exceeded its regulatory authority and engaged in law-making, thereby infringing upon legislative jurisdiction. View "New York Statewide Coalition of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. New York City Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene" on Justia Law

In 2012, Petitioner, the Albany County Surrogate, was served with a complaint alleging three charges of judicial misconduct based on her failure to disqualify herself from matters involving two of her personal attorneys and her campaign manager. The Commission on Judicial Conduct sustained the charges of misconduct against her and directed the she be removed from office. The Court of Appeals agreed with the findings of misconduct and accepted the sanction of removal, concluding that Petitioner did not meet her obligation of guarding against the impression of favoritism in the matters, and that Petitioner’s prior censure constituted a significant aggravating factor warranting a sanction of removal. View "In re Hon. Cathryn M. Doyle" on Justia Law

In the first case involved in this appeal, Defendant pleaded guilty to criminal possession of marihuana. Defendant appealed, asserting that his plea was invalid because the record did not affirmatively demonstrate the waiver of his Boykin rights. The Appellate Term affirmed. In the second case, Defendant pleaded guilty to criminal sale of marihuana. Defendant appealed, arguing, as in the first case, that the waiver of his Boykin rights was nonexistent. The Appellate Term affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed in both cases, holding that because the records in both cases were silent as to Defendant's waiver of his Boykin rights, the pleas must be vacated.View "People v. Tyrell" on Justia Law

In 2000, Defendant pleaded guilty to attempted assault in the first degree. The trial court orally sentenced Defendant to a fifteen-year determinate sentence of incarceration without pronouncing the term of postrelease supervision (PRS) required under N.Y. Penal Law 70.45. In 2008, the Legislature enacted N.Y. Penal Law 70.85, which makes an exception to section 70.45 by allowing a determinate sentence without a term of PRS to stand as a legal sentence. In 2010, the People moved to resentence Defendant under N.Y. Penal Law 70.85, and Supreme Court resentenced Defendant under section 70.85 to a determinate term of fifteen years without PRS. Defendant appealed, claiming that section 70.85 was unconstitutional because he denied him the right to vacate his guilty plea. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that section 70.85 is a constitutionally permissible legislative remedy for the defectiveness of a plea. View "People v. Pignataro" on Justia Law