Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

IDT Corp. and Tyco International Ltd. litigated and negotiated for fifteen years over the development and use of a telecommunications system. In 2004, IDT claimed that Tyco breached its obligation under a 2000 settlement agreement to negotiate additional agreements in good faith. The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, concluding that IDT’s claim was unsupported by the record. After the Court’s decision, more negotiations took place. In 2010, IDT again sued Tyco for breach of contract and breach of the duty to negotiate in good faith. The Court of Appeals rejected IDT’s claim, holding that the parties’ obligation to negotiate in good faith came to an end without a breach by either party because the parties had reached a “good faith impasse.” View "IDT Corp. v Tyco Group, S.A.R.L." on Justia Law

A twelve-year-old middle school student (“student”) was injured when she was struck by a car before an approaching school bus stopped to pick her up. Plaintiff, the student’s mother, filed a personal injury action individually and on behalf of her daughter against the school district (“district”). The district moved for summary judgment, arguing that it owed no duty to a student not within its physical care or custody. Supreme Court denied the district’s motion, holding that the district court the student a duty of care because she was a special education student. The Appellate Division affirmed as modified, holding that the district did not owe the student a duty of care because she was a special education student, but, under the facts presented, the district owed a duty to the student based upon the actions of the district. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the district did not owe a duty of reasonable care to the student under the circumstances of this case. View "Williams v. Weatherstone" on Justia Law

After Plaintiff was terminated from her position as chief operating officer for Communication Action for Human Services, Inc., Plaintiff filed suit against Community Action and its chief executive officer (collectively, Defendants), alleging that she had been terminated in violation of N.Y. Labor Law 740(2), the whistleblower statute, for registering complaints with public agencies concerning policies and practices of Community Action. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, asserting that the complaint was deficient because it failed to identify the particular “law, rule or regulation” Defendants were claimed to have violated. Supreme Court left Plaintiff’s section 740 claim intact, but the Appellate Division dismissed the section 740 claim because of Plaintiff’s failure to “identify a specific law, rule or regulation that Defendants purportedly violated.” The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) in order to recover under a Labor Law 740 theory, a plaintiff’s complaint need not specify the actual law, rule or regulation violated; and (2) Plaintiff’s complaint in this case was sufficient to state a cause of action under section 740. View "Webb-Weber v. Cmty. Action for Human Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant, the son of a Dead Sea Scrolls scholar, launched an internet campaign to attack the integrity and harm the reputation of other Dead Sea Scrolls academics and scholars. To accomplish his goal of discrediting and harming these individuals, Defendant used pseudonyms and impersonated real academics and scholars in communicating with academics, museum administrators, and reporters. A jury convicted Defendant on thirty counts, including several counts of identity theft, criminal impersonation, forgery, and aggravated harassment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions for nine counts of criminal impersonation in the second degree and all the convictions for forgery and vacated the remainder of the convictions, holding (1) the mere creation of email accounts in others’ names, which accounts are not used, does not constitute criminal conduct; (2) the aggravated harassment statute is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad; (3) the People did not sustain their burden of proof that Defendant was guilty of unauthorized use of university computers; and (4) there was insufficient evidence to support Defendant’s convictions of identity theft in the second degree. View "People v. Golb" on Justia Law

Petitioners were found not responsible for crimes they committed by reason of mental disease or defect. Petitioners were eventually released from confinement into the community, subject to a five-year order of conditions. The New York State Office of Mental Health (OMH) later requested that the supervising court extend the order of conditions. In its proposed order, OMH asked the court to include an effective-evaluation provision, which would allow the OMH to seek judicial approval of a mandatory psychiatric evaluation in a secure facility if Petitioners failed to comply with the conditions of their release and refused to undergo voluntary examination. Petitioners sought writs of prohibition barred enforcement of the effective-evaluation provisions, arguing that the provisions were inconsistent with N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 330.20(14)’s specific procedure for recommitment orders. The Appellate division granted the petitions, concluding that the effective-evaluation provision was barred by the recommitment provisions in section 330.20(14). The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that section 330.20(14) does not prohibit inclusion of an effective-evaluation provision in an order of conditions. View "Allen B. v. Sproat" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of trespass and resisting arrest. Defendant appealed, arguing that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to arrest him for trespass because the officer knew that Defendant had been invited to be on the premises. The County Court reversed the trespass convictions, determining that Defendant could not be a trespasser because he was the invited guest of a resident of the property, but affirmed the resisting arrest conviction, concluding that the officer had probable cause to arrest Defendant. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) where a defendant unsuccessfully argues before trial that the facts alleged by the People did not constitute the crime charged, and the trial court rejects the argument, the defendant need not specifically repeat the argument in a trial motion to dismiss in order to preserve the issue for appeal; and (2) under the circumstances of this case, there was insufficient evidence that Defendant committed the crime of resisting arrest. View "People v. Finch" on Justia Law

Plaintiff initiated litigation to recover wrongfully diverted and concealed proceeds of a loan agreement, asserting that Defendants conspired to avoid repayment by denying their ownership and control over entities used to conceal converted funds. Before the conclusion of discovery in New York, federal authorities arrested Defendants, charging them with tax evasion and alleging a conspiracy to commit fraud on the New York court by forging documents and suborning perjury. A jury convicted Defendants of tax evasion, and the district court concluded that Defendants had perpetrated fraud on Supreme Court in New York. After Defendants’ sentencing, Plaintiff filed a motion to strike Defendants’ pleadings and for a default judgment. Supreme Court determined that Defendants had perpetrated a fraud on the court and granted the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part, holding (1) where a court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, conduct that constitutes fraud on the court, the court may impose sanctions including striking pleadings and entering default judgment against the offending parties; and (2) with one exception, the record supported such sanctions against Defendants. View "CDR Creances S.A.S. v. Cohen" on Justia Law

Corporation, which owned corporate operating accounts at Bank, took out a loan and line of credit. Corporation passed a corporate resolution providing that unless it notified Bank within fourteen days of an improperly paid item in order to recover the payment, Bank would not be held liable for any error in Corporation’s account. Corporation later discovered that its bookkeeper had been forging signatures on certain Bank documents and had embezzled approximately $386,000 over the course of two years. Corporation sued Bank to prevent Bank from forcing repayment on the loans. Bank counterclaimed to recover amounts due under the loans. Supreme Court granted summary judgment for Bank, concluding that a bank and its customer may agree to shorten from one year to fourteen days the statutory time period under N.Y. U.C.C. Law 4-406(4) within which the customer must notify its bank of an improperly paid item in order to recover the payment thereon. The Court of Appeals affirmed as modified, holding (1) a customer and bank can contractually reduce section 4-406(4)’s one-year limitations period; and (2) shortening the one-year period to fourteen days was not manifestly unreasonable under the facts of this case. View "Clemente Bros. Contracting Corp. v Hafner-Milazzo" on Justia Law

Respondent pleaded guilty to several violent sex offenses. As Respondent’s release date approached, the State commenced a N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law 10 proceeding seeking a determination that Respondent was a detained sex offender requiring civil management. Prior to trial, Respondent moved to preclude the State’s expert witness from presenting hearsay basis testimony about a rape he was never charged with committing. Supreme Court denied the motion. The State’s expert witness testified at trial, briefly describing the uncharged crime. The jury returned a verdict finding that Respondent suffered from a mental abnormality. Following a dispositional hearing, Supreme Court determined that Respondent was a dangerous sex offender in need of confinement and committed him to a secure treatment facility. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the expert witness to testify about the uncharged rape, but the error was harmless under the circumstances. View "State v. Charada T." on Justia Law

A grand jury charged Defendants, the president and CEO of a leading materials testing company and the company’s vice-president, with engaging in a pattern of criminal activity while intentionally conducting and participating in the affairs of a criminal enterprise. The indictment alleged that Defendants committed or allowed certain of the company’s employees to engage in illegal acts involving the falsification of test results, improper inspections of construction projects, and double-billing of clients. After a jury trial, both defendants were convicted of enterprise corruption and several non-enterprise corruption offenses. The Appellate Division modified by vacating the enterprise corruption convictions on the basis that the convictions lacked sufficient proof and were against the weight of the evidence. Both parties appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed as modified, holding that the Appellate Division did not apply the proper legal standards when it reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence supporting Defendants’ convictions for enterprise corruption and that the People’s evidence was legally sufficient to support the enterprise corruption convictions. Remanded. View "People v. Kancharla" on Justia Law